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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Of Veils and Operators: The Liability of a Parent
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Site Owned by Its Subsidiary
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More than a decade ago, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), commonly referred
to as Superfund, to deal with the
dangers presented by thousands of
landfills and other facilities where
hazardous substances were leaking
or seeping into the environment.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Under CERCLA, the Government
has spent billions of dollars
remediating hazardous conditions
at hundreds of high-priority sites
and performing smaller-scale
cleanups at thousands of others.
These Government-initiated
cleanup efforts are expensive. So, in
an effort to recover as much of its
costs as possible, the Government
looks to those responsible for
the hazardous activities. Under
CERCLA, those who owned or
operated a facility at the time the
hazardous conditions were created
are included among the liable
parties.
The United States has taken the
position that a parent corporation
can be liable as a past operator if
the parent corporation actually par-
ticipated in the day-to-day opera-
tion of a subsidiary corporation that
owned a facility where hazardous
materials were released. However,
the parent corporations in this case
contend that CERCLA was not
intended to overturn the principles
of limited liability that are so cen-
tral to corporation law. They say
that under those principles, a par-
ent corporation cannot be liable
under CERCLA simply because it
had involvement with its subsidiary
in an effort to protect its invest-
ment. In their view, the
Government must establish a par-
ent's liability by "piercing the corpo-
rate veil," i.e., proving that a parent
corporation so abused the corporate
form that the separate personalities
of the two corporations ceased to
exist and continued adherence to
the fiction of two corporations
would work a fraud or other wrong.
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The United States, on the other
hand, insists that the language of
CERCLA imposes liability on any
operating entity regardless of corpo-
rate status. In its view, Congress
intended to disregard the limitations
of state corporation law and forge a
new standard of federal liability
based on a person's or an entity's
own conduct.
These competing views are now
before the Supreme Court. The case
is a high-stakes battle worth hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to corpo-
rations or to taxpayers, whichever
side loses.
ISSUE
May a parent corporation be held
liable under CERCLA as an operator
of a subsidiary's facility when the
parent actively participated in and
exercised control over the opera-
tions of the subsidiary or must
sufficient cause exist to pierce the
corporate veil that, under general
principles of corporation law, immu-
nizes a parent corporation for a
subsidiary's conduct absent some
culpable conduct by the parent
such as fraud?
FACTS
During the early 1970s, an upsurge
of public concern about various pol-
lution problems prompted Congress
to enact a number of environmental
programs. These initial efforts
focused largely on cleaning up
polluted air, rivers, and lakes.
When the risks posed by the land-
based disposal of hazardous material
became apparent, Congress passed
the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") in 1976.
Codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. beginning at § 6901. RCRA
established an elaborate regulatory
scheme to govern the future trans-
portation, treatment, storage, and
disposal of hazardous waste.
It quickly became clear that
prospective regulatory programs
such as RCRA were inadequate to
address problems created by past
environmental neglect. As the 1970s
drew to a close, Congress discov-
ered an unhappy legacy: the leaking
barrels and contaminated soil at
sites such as Love Canal and the
Valley of the Drums created by
years of unregulated disposal.
To deal with this problem, Congress
enacted CERCLA, an ambitious
piece of legislation, in December
1980. CERCLA was designed to give
the Government the authority and
funding necessary to clean up cont-
amination at abandoned or inactive
facilities caused by the past release
of hazardous substances.
Congress recognized, however, that
federal funds alone could not cover
all of the costs associated with the
Government's response actions.
To address the problem, Congress
included a liability provision to help
the Government recoup its response
costs and make those responsible
bear the costs of their actions.
CERCLA's net of potential liability
is cast widely. Among others, it
includes (1) the present owner and
operator of a facility where haz-
ardous substances have been
released and (2) "any person who
at the time of disposal owned or
operated" such a facility. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1),(2).
The consequences of being held
responsible under CERCLA for envi-
ronmental cleanup can be severe.
If the United States establishes lia-
bility, the responsible parties are
strictly liable - liable without fault
- for the Government's cleanup
costs. In addition, if the environ-
mental harm is indivisible, the
responsible parties are jointly and
severally liable, i.e., each party is
liable for the entire cost of cleanup.
See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
Armed with CERCLA, the
Government in this case sought
its cleanup costs associated with a
chemical manufacturing facility
located in Dalton Township,
Michigan, known as the Muskegon
site. The facility had a number of
corporate incarnations beginning
with the Ott Chemical Company
("Ott I"), which operated the
Muskegon site between 1959 and
1965. During that period, Ott I
discharged waste water containing
hazardous substances into two
unlined lagoons.
Ott I also buried drums containing
hazardous materials, spilled chemi-
cals during the loading of rail cars,
and dumped still more hazardous
chemicals in the woods. By 1964,
the groundwater flowing beneath
the Muskegon site had become
contaminated.
CPC International ("CPC") bought
Ott I in 1965 and then created a
subsidiary that purchased Ott I's
assets and took the name of Ott
Chemical Company ("Ott II"). Ott II
expanded the manufacturing capaci-
ty at the Muskegon site and contin-
ued to use the unlined lagoons until
at least 1968, enlarging them to
accommodate additional hazardous
material.
During much of this time, three or
more of Ott II's directors were offi-
cers of CPC, and the chairman of
the board was a high-level CPC offi-
cial. In addition, many of Ott II's
key managers were officers of CPC,
and CPC's environmental manager
actively participated in and exerted
control over a variety of pollution
activities at Ott II.
(Continued on Page 372)
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CPC sold Ott II to Story Chemical
Company ("Story") in 1972 for
approximately $10 million. Story
continued to manufacture chemicals
at the Muskegon site until bankrupt-
cy ended its operations in 1977, and
title passed to the bankruptcy
trustee.
Recognizing that the Muskegon
site posed a serious environmental
threat, Michigan's Department of
Natural Resources ("MDNR") tried
to attract a purchaser who would
help effect a cleanup. This effort
led MDNR into discussions with
Aerojet-General Corporation
("Aerojet").
Aerojet then formed a wholly owned
subsidiary, Cordova Chemical
Company ("Cordova/California"),
which bought the Muskegon site
from the bankruptcy trustee in
1977. As part of this arrangement,
Cordova/California agreed with
MDNR to perform certain cleanup
activities and MDNR agreed to share
in the cost. Before chemical manu-
facturing activities resumed, howev-
er, Cordova/California created a
wholly owned Michigan subsidiary,
Cordova Chemical Company of
Michigan ("Cordova/Michigan"), and
transferred title of the Muskegon
site to the new company.
Cordova/Michigan operated the
Muskegon site until 1986. While no
new waste was buried or dumped
during this period, the preexisting
groundwater problem was not reme-
died and various waste drums as
well as contaminated soil remained
on site. During this period, the
subsidiary's board was inactive, and
Aerojet officials dominated its
management.
The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (the "EPA") iden-
tified the Muskegon site as a serious
public health risk shortly after
CERCLA became law. In 1982, the
EPA placed the Muskegon site on its
high-priority list for remediation.
Since then, the EPA has incurred
substantial cleanup costs while for-
mulating and implementing a multi-
million dollar plan to clean up the
contaminated soil, surface water,
and groundwater.
The Government later filed a cost-
recovery suit in federal district
court against a number of potential-
ly responsible parties including CPC
and Aerojet, two parent corpora-.
tions associated with the Muskegon
site. Former corporate owners -
Ott I, Ott II, and Story - no longer
exist.
The district court concluded that
both CPC and Aerojet were liable
because they had participated in the
operation of the Muskegon site
through their respective subsidiaries
and, therefore, had been operators
of the site for purposes of CERCLA.
777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
CPC and Aerojet appealed to the
Sixth Circuit, and a three-judge
panel reversed. 59 F.3d 584 (6th
Cir. 1995). The United States suc-
cessfully petitioned for rehearing in
banc (see Glossary), but, by a vote
of seven to five, the Sixth Circuit
also reversed. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.
1997).
The in banc majority held that a
parent corporation is not responsi-
ble as an operator merely because it
participated in and exercised some
control over the management of a
subsidiary's facility. In fact, said the
majority, to successfully assert oper-
ator status against such a parent
corporation, the United States
would have to resort to traditional
corporation law notions and ask a
court to disregard the parent's sepa-
rate corporate personality because
of some sort of fraud or other
misconduct.
That decision is now before the
Supreme Court, which granted the
petition of the United States for a
writ of certiorari. 118 S. Ct. 621
(1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The United States contends that the
Sixth Circuit majority misinterpret-
ed CERCLA by adopting a rule
freeing a parent corporation from
CERCLA liability even though it had
participated actively in the opera-
tion of a facility and thus shares
responsibility for hazardous condi-
tions at the site. CERCLA, notes the
Government, provides that "any
person" who "owned or operated" a
facility at the time hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of is liable for
the Government's cleanup costs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
CERCLA defines "person" broadly
to include corporations as well as
other business entities, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21), but does not define the
term "operate," other than provid-
ing that the owner or operator of a
facility is "any person owning or
operating such facility," 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(ii), which merely
begs the question. Notwithstanding
CERCLA's definitional shortcom-
ings, the Government contends that
"operate" should be construed in
accordance with its ordinary mean-
ing and that meaning certainly
includes directing or managing the
way in which a facility works.
Therefore, argues the Government,
a former corporate parent may be
liable as an operator if it actively
participated in or exercised control
over a hazardous waste facility.
Issue No. 6
The Government maintains that
this reading is supported by another
provision in the statute. CERCLA
specifically excludes secured
lenders from being treated as own-
ers or operators, but only as long as
they do not "participate in the man-
agement of a ... facility." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(E)(i).
This exception is crucial according
to the Government. Congress'
unwillingness to excuse from opera-
tor liability lenders who participate
in managing a facility suggests that
a parent corporation participating in
the management of a subsidiary is
potentially liable as an operator of a
contaminated facility.
CPC and Aerojet respond that
Congress never intended to abandon
the traditional doctrine of limited
liability that accompanies the cor-
porate form in favor of some new
and ill-defined concept of participa-
tion or active control. In support,
one can point, as did the Sixth
Circuit majority, to the different
ways in which the statute defines
owner or operator.
For facilities such as the Muskegon
site, the statute simply refers to
"any person owning or operating the
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
However, for facilities that have
been involuntarily conveyed to state
or local governments because of
abandonment or such events as tax
delinquency or bankruptcy, the
term means "any person who
owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility
immediately [before its transfer]."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
The Sixth Circuit majority thus rea-
soned that Congress distinguished
between operators and those who
otherwise controlled a facility. As a
result, nothing in CERCLA indicates
that a parent corporation becomes
an operator simply through active
participation in and control over the
affairs of a subsidiary.
The Government counters that the
majority's reasoning is fundamental-
ly flawed because it fails to recog-
nize that the original purpose of the
special definition was to address the
problem of abandoned sites that
likely had been nonoperational for
some time prior to abandonment.
Thus, contends the Government, it
made sense for Congress to state
clearly that an owner or operator of
such sites could be someone who
had controlled activities prior to a
site's involuntary transfer through
abandonment, bankruptcy, or other
mechanism. According to the
Government, it simply is illogical to
say that an owner or operator can-
not be a person or other entity that
controlled operations at an active
facility while acknowledging that
the opposite would be true at an
inactive facility.
CPC and Aerojet respond that
CERCLA's language is too vague and
its legislative history too sketchy to
conclude that Congress meant to
discard the limited-liability protec-
tion that corporations have tradi-
tionally enjoyed. If Congress had
intended to do so, it would have
used language clearly extending
liability to parent corporations.
Because no such language appears
anywhere in CERCLA, courts ought
not to reject the bright-line test the
veil-piercing doctrine provides and
replace it with some sort of nebu-
lous control test.
The cost of abandoning traditional
corporation law principles is simply
too high, say CPC and Aerojet.
Corporations acting in a manner
consistent with their investment
relationships ought to know precise-
ly when their activity will trigger
liability, perhaps of a devastating
nature.
The United States replies by saying
that the language of CERCLA does
subject persons, including corporate
entities, to direct liability based on
their own actions in operating a
facility. There is no need, therefore,
to use veil-piercing doctrines to find
a parent corporation liable for the
actions of a subsidiary when the
parent is liable directly for its own
actions.
Congress imposed liability both on
owners and operators to ensure that
those responsible for creating haz-
ardous conditions pay for remedia-
tion. Surely, the Government con-
tends, it would frustrate Congress'
purpose in enacting CERCLA to
apply irrelevant principles drawn
from state law.
The Government also disputes
claims about the bright-line that
veil-piercing doctrines based on
state law allegedly provide. It argues
that veil-piercing doctrines have not
produced clear rules governing a
parent corporation's liability.
Accordingly, use of state-law rules
would require extensive litigation
concerning their application.
Moreover, argues the Government,
using state law to establish the
CERCLA liability of a parent corpo-
ration would undermine the fairness
and uniformity of the statutory pro-
gram because inconsistent state-law
standards would lead to different
findings of liability depending on
which state's law applies, the very
kind of geographical disparity
Congress sought to avoid.
(Continued on Page 374)
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CPC and Aerojet counter with the
suggestion that the purposes of
CERCLA are better served by adopt-
ing a narrower approach to parent
liability. By using traditional corpo-
ration law principles, corporations
can use well-capitalized, nonfraudu-
lent subsidiaries to purchase and
rehabilitate contaminated sites
without risking all of their assets.
If, however, corporations are
exposed to an expansive form of
liability, then, as the Sixth Circuit
majority asserted, fewer sites will be
remediated privately because no
rational corporate officer would
ever accept the risk posed by the
Government's active-participation-
and-control test.
The United States replies by saying
that its test would more likely
prevent releases of hazardous
substances by encouraging those
actually in control to be careful. Of
course, the Government points out
that it really does not matter which
policy argument is the more persua-
sive. In the final analysis, such poli-
cy judgments are for Congress to
make, not the courts. Congress was
entitled to enact and, according to
the Government, did enact a statute
imposing federal liability on those
who actively participate in and
exercise control over the running
of a facility.
SIGNIFICANCE
The United States does not routine-
ly seek to hold parent corporations
responsible for the hazardous condi-
tions at facilities owned by sub-
sidiaries. In many instances, parent
corporations simply do not exercise
control over or participate in the
way in which such facilities are
operated. However, the active-par-
ticipation-and-control principle is
important because exceptions do
occur as illustrated by this case.
CERCLA implements the policy
decision that those responsible for
creating the problem, rather than
the public at large, are supposed to
bear the cost of cleanup. If state
corporation-law principles apply,
however, even parent corporations
that exercise substantial control will
escape liability.
The Muskegon site is one of the
most severely contaminated in the
nation. Its cleanup will likely cost
more than $100 million. Three of
the potentially responsible parties,
however, no longer exist. The two
parent corporations, therefore, are
not only responsible in the eyes of
the United States for creating the
problem, they are apparently the
only private parties who are finan-
cially able to contribute to the site's
remediation in a meaningful way.
Large corporations in this situation
do not believe they should incur lia-
bility simply because they possess
deep pockets and happened to have
exerted some degree of influence
over a subsidiary's business. From
the corporate point of view, the use
of subsidiaries is a time-honored
way in which larger corporations
seek to reduce risk, including their
exposure to liability.
It is typical, moreover, for parent
corporations to take an active inter-
est in the affairs of a subsidiary. As
long as the corporate formalities are
observed and no fraud or injustice
results, parent corporations have
been traditionally immune for the
actions of their subsidiaries. If such
a sensible and legitimate method for
protecting corporate assets is dis-
missed, then, the argument goes,
many contaminated sites may never
be cleaned up because no well-
capitalized corporation would ever
agree to purchase and help remedi-
ate such sites by using a subsidiary.
The United States believes, however,
that if it loses, those parent corpora-
tions that can and actually do
control disposal practices at sub-
sidiary corporations will not have
such a strong reason to prevent
environmental contamination. The
Government also is concerned that
the principle relied on by the Sixth
Circuit majority may be extended to
other contexts. The Sixth Circuit,
for example, recently held that a
sole shareholder "is not liable as an
operator as defined [in CERCLAI
unless circumstances justify pierc-
ing the corporate veil." Donahey v.
Bogle, 129 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir.
1997), petition for cert. filed. Thus,
if the Supreme Court affirms the
Sixth Circuit in this case, the
United States might encounter
much greater difficulty in asserting
operator liability against corporate
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